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IKE all forms of commercial transport before it, air transport issues
tickets and traffic documents to passengers and shippers. There
is no essential legal difference in this system of documentation between
airlines and, for example, railroads. The nature of these documents
and their relationship to the basic contract of carriage are subjects well
developed in all important legal systems.
Although the Warsaw Convention has placed air transportation in
a peculiar situation by setting down detailed rules for the issuance and
contents of the documents, it did not change their relationship with
the contract of carriage under common law. Air traffic documents are
"common form documents" with all the inherent correlatives under
English and American law. The documents are evidence of the existence, validity and terms of the contract, but their absence, irregularity
or loss does not affect the existence of the contract or its terms.
While centuries of precedent in other forms of transport have dealt
with many of the basic legal problems involved in airline documentation, certain legal complications have been created for air transport by
the need for uniformity and even universality in these terms and relationships to facilitate the growing volume of interline carriage on a
worldwide basis.
UNIFORMITY -

RECENT TRENDS

Every airline began operations with its own ideas as to how traffic
documents should be drawn up, but so long as every carrier operated
with divergent documents and under different conditions, the carriage
of passengers or cargo on services of more than one airline required a
new set of documents for each carrier involved. Furthermore, since
there was no international law regulating air carriage, carriers found
it advisable to consolidate the terms of their contracts and to develop
documents which would stand up before various courts.
* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not
necessarily represent the official point of view of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA).
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The Prewar Period
The first uniform Conditions of Carriage were developed in 1927
by members of the old IATA - the International Air Traffic Association. These Conditions were so framed that the carrier was generally
under no liability to those with whom he had entered a contract of
carriage, either for the injury or death of the passenger or for loss of
or damage to cargo, except where such liability was imposed on the
carrier by applicable law.
While carriers were preparing these first Conditions, CITEJA 1
began to work on two projects: the Convention on the liability of air
carriers, and the Convention on the air waybill. After five years of
deliberation, from 1925 to 1929, the two projects were consolidated
and the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air was signed at Warsaw on 12 November 1929. The new convention substantially modified carriers' legal
position insofar as it restricted the contractual freedom which they
had hitherto enjoyed in many jurisdictions. Roughly speaking, the
Warsaw Convention created a presumption of fault on the part of the
carrier and, as a quid pro quo, set specific limits to the liability of the
carrier. Also, the Convention incorporated detailed rules regarding
documents of carriage (passenger tickets, baggage checks and air waybills). In an effort to comply with these detailed rules, new standard
tickets, baggage checks and air waybills, incorporating new uniform
General Conditions of Carriage, were developed by the old IATA in
1931. To assure that the new documents complied strictly with the
Warsaw Convention, the forms were submitted to and aDDroved by
CITEJA.
Despite this approval, an English Court held in 1936 that the IATA
air waybill did not comply with the requirements of the Warsaw Convention. 2 In the light of legal decisions of various other Courts and of
technical improvements in the handling of traffic, the documents were
modified from time to time. The basic relationship between the documents and IATA 1931 Conditions of Carriage, however, remained
unaltered.
In order to complete the record of development of the traffic documents prior to World War II, the Trans-Oceanic World-Wide Conditions of Carriage prepared in New York in 1939, and the "Simplified
Conditions and References to the General Conditions of Carriage"
drawn up in Leiden in 1939 and known as "the Leiden Conditions"
deserve mention. The former were intended to govern commercial
traffic over the Atlantic and Pacific, the latter were designed to be set
out on the passenger ticket, baggage check and air waybill in Europe
1 Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens

(CITEJA).
See Philippson v. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1939) A.C. 332; (1939) 1 All.
E.R. 761; (1939) U.S. Av. R. 63; Digest Supp., and Westminister Bank, Ltd. v.
Imperial Airways, Ltd., (1936) 2 All E. R. 890; (1936), U.S. Av. R. 39; Digest
Supp.
2

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

and in the Eastern Hemisphere, as a reference to carriers' conditions of
carriage.
Because of the outbreak of World War II, the Trans-Oceanic Conditions of Carriage were not endorsed by the old IATA and the "Leiden Conditions" were put into use only in Europe.
The PostwarPeriod
The resumption of general international air transport after the war,
when the new IATA - the International Air Transport Association was established, found the airlines using a variety of traffic documents
and conditions of carriage which differed greatly in their terms. Some
followed the 1931 IATA Conditions of Carriage and used the "Leiden
Conditions" on their traffic documents in much the same way as the
later IATA "Conditions of Contract" have been used as a short-form
for the same purpose.
Others, operating under an essentially different regime, were
obliged by national laws to file "tariffs" with government agencies.
Still others in South America offered carriage under conditions inconsistent with both the 1931 Conditions and the tariffs of other airlines.
Thus, one of the first aims of the reorganized and worldwide IATA
was the standardization of the documents and terms of the conditions
of carriage under which carriage was to be contracted on lines of successive carriers. This was a difficult, but nevertheless urgent project.
The prewar IATA documents and conditions could be considered only
as one aspect of a problem which necessarily included the legal and
practical requirements of the well developed American "tariff" system
and the needs of South American and Far East operations as well.
New forms of traffic documents to meet these new needs were developed first, when the IATA Traffic Conferences at Rio de Janeiro
adopted standard IATA passenger ticket, baggage check and air waybill
in 1947. Although these forms have undergone considerable amendment since, they have never been subjected to serious legal question.
Some concern was expressed regarding the indication of agreed stopping places,8 the abbreviations of carriers' names and of towns of departure and destination, and to the reference to the Warsaw Convention on the ticket and waybill, but a recent Court decision 4 has reaffirmed the legality of the present practice.
3

Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the Warsaw Convention.

4 Kraus v. KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) U.S. 2 Avi. p. 15,017. It was argued

"that the limitation of liability does not apply here because the waybill does not
conform to the requirements of the Warsaw Convention, that it contains a statement of the 'agreed stopping places.' In space provided for this information, the
waybill states: 'See lists of scheduled places in the time tables of the carriers
concerned, which lists (but not the times therein) are made hereof.' The purpose
of this requirement was to enable one to determine whether or not the carriage
was international within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. The incorporation by reference to a published and readily available time table is a sufficient

compliance with the provisions of article 8(c) of the Warsaw Convention, especially in this case, since the international character of the air carriage could
readily be determined from the 'place of departure' and the 'place of destination'
appearing on the face of the air waybill."
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Simultaneously with the drawing up of the standard forms of
traffic documents, carriers also agreed to the so-called IATA "Conditions of Contract," really a short form of the Conditions of Carriage
to be printed on the limited area of the traffic documents.
. The title of the Conditions of Contract is not, perhaps, entirely
descriptive. They might more properly be termed "Excerpts of the
General Conditions of Carriage" or "Reference Conditions." However,
since no agreement could be reached in 1947 on a standard IATA
General Conditions of Carriage, the aspect of reference to these Conditions could not be emphasized in the title, nor could-they be called
excerpts of a non-existent uniform document.
The question as to whether it was necessary or not to print Conditions on the traffic documents in addition to a reference to the Conditions of Carriage was never clearly determined. It was suggested that
certain legal systems, particularly in Latin America, might not recognize the terms of the Contract of Carriage unless they were in writing
on the ticket or air waybill. The practice may also have some justification in English Law where the fear was expressed as to the validity
of a Condition of the Contract of Carriage excluding or limiting carriers' liability by reference. 5 If these Conditions were not printed on
the ticket or air waybill, certain courts might not consider the reference
as adequate "notice" to passengers and shippers and might question
the consent of passenger or shipper to these terms of the Contract.
As a matter of record, the IATA Conditions of Contract were redrafted at Bermuda in 1949 and amended at Madrid in 1950 to incorporate policy decisions of the airlines regarding their contractural
liability undertaking. The situation discussed here, however, was not
affected.
Bermuda Conditions of Carriage (1949)
The third step toward standardization was the drafting of a standard General Conditions of Carriage which might replace the prewar
IATA Conditions. This was an extremely ambitious project. To be
completely successful, it would have to meet the requirements of those
countries where carriers were obliged to file rules tariffs, to cover air
traffic on a worldwide basis, and conform to the traffic and operational
procedures of more than 60 airlines. Considering the stage of development which air transport had reached at the conclusion of the Second
World War, these proved to be insurmountable difficulties. International carriers were not quite ready to give up their own traffic procedures for the sake of uniformity - and particularly on the very
many issues which must be covered by the tariffs filed by airlines in
North America.
It was therefore realized that no complete solution could be expected from this first effort and the focus of inquiry was narrowed
down to a .determination of how much standardization could be
5These liability rules are dealt with specifically in Part III.
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achieved in the shortest possible time. This proved to be the acceptance by carriers at Bermuda in 1949 as a recommended practice of the
new IATA "Conditions of Carriage - Rules Tariff," which was drafted
on the basis of the prewar IATA Conditions of 1931, the Trans-Oceanic
Global Conditions of 1939, and the Rules Tariffs of certain American
carriers.
This Bermuda document, which could be termed as the new IATA
Conditions of Carriage, represented a compromise between the European conception of "conditions of carriage" as the terms of contract,
and the American system of publishing all rules in a tariff filed with
the U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Canadian Air Transport Board (ATB).
While the Bermuda document might be considered as an important
step forward to standardization of the rules covering international air
carriage, their status is entirely different from the prewar IATA Conditions of Carriage. The latter was a uniform contract, whereas the
Bermuda Conditions are not mandatory. They are, rather, a set of
Recommended Practices which have only moral effect and which the
airlines are free to change, modify, or alter as long as they reproduce
the contents of the Conditions of Contract. As a result, for an interim
period at least, the situation remained chaotic. Notwithstanding the
high degree of acceptance of the bulk of the Bermuda recommendations
by many carriers, a representative cross-section of the Conditions of
Carriage currently adopted by various airlines indicated several general trends of deviation from the Bermuda document.
One group of carriers, in an endeavor to meet the requirements of
the CAB 6 and ATB, decided to include more detail in the so-called
Consolidated Rules Tariff7 than were considered necessary in the Bermuda Conditions of Carriage. On the other hand, the tendency among
European carriers in general, was either to omit a great deal of detail
included in the Bermuda Conditions or to replace them by general
statements of principle. The purpose of European carriers could have
been to reduce the Conditions of Carriage to a bare text which was
not liable to change, so that it could be printed in permanent form,
either in booklets or on posters to be displayed on the walls of passenger and cargo receiving centres.
The new IATA traffic documents, together with the Conditions of
Contract, were put into practice on a worldwide basis - but the carriers' Conditions of Carriage, to which these documents referred, were
sometimes inconsistent with the terms of the Conditions of Contract.
These inconsistencies resulted in several confusing situations. First,
which conditions - Conditions of Contract on the uniform documents
6 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (49 U.S. 403) CAB Economic Regulations
221 and subs.
7 Consolidated Rules Tariff issued on one (1) day's notice under special tariff
permission of the Civil Aeronautics Board No. 4660 and under special permission
No. 1102 dated June 8, 1951 of the Air Transport Board. Issued by W. D. Barrington, Agent, International Air Transport Association, 509 Madison Ave., New
York 22, N.Y., U.S.A.
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or the individual carriers' Conditions of Carriage - would override the
others in the case of conflict? Fortunately, this point was not raised
before the Courts at the time and the carriers have since brought their
individual Conditions of Carriage into line with the IATA Conditions
of Contract - other discrepancies notwithstanding.
The second question arose in connection with interline carriage.
Individual airlines sell transportation and issue traffic documents, not
only over their own linei, but also over the lines of other carriers.
Which carriers' Conditions of Carriage are incorporated by reference
in the written Conditions of Contract on the document - those of the
issuing, the first, the carrying, the connecting or the last carrier?
The third difficulty arises from the necessity to give passengers and
shippers reasonable opportunity to investigate the terms of the Conditions of Carriage should they so desire. 8 This requirement is met by
having available for inspection in the offices of the carrier or its agents
the Conditions of Carriage under which they operate. So long as there
are inconsistencies between the Conditions of Carriage of individual
airlines, any carrier doing interline business would seem to be required
to keep in its offices, and those of its agents, copies of the Conditions of
Carriage of all other carriers with whom it does such business. For the
time being, and until uniformity is achieved, only this rather expensive and burdensome arrangement would seem to satisfy the scrupulous legal mind.
For the time being, then, there is a uniform IATA Conditions of
Contract 9 used by IATA member carriers, even though there is no
uniformity in their Conditions of Carriage. What, it might be asked,
would be the situation of a Court deliberating the proper interpretation of the Conditions of Carriage under these circumstances?
Presumably, the Court would take into consideration these factors:
i-the form of the document, particularly insofar as it supplied
information on the essentials of the contract;
ii - the endorsement under the heading of Conditions of Contract;
and
iii - the carriers' own Conditions of Carriage, more or less on the
basis of the Bermuda documents.
The Conditions of Contract printed on the document provide, for all
practical purposes, the link between the carrier and the passenger
and/or shipper. Under the circumstances, they are of paramount importance because they serve two major functions:
i -they
provide a reference to the carriers' Conditions of Carriage; and
ii - they incorporate in the documents the most important liability
rules governing the contract of carriage.
It is now proposed to note some of the legal questions involved in the
performance of these two functions.
8 Hood v. Anchor Line, Henderson Bros. (1918)

9 The Bermuda Conditions of Carriage practices only.

A.C. 837-846.
Rules Tariff, are recommended

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
VALIDITY OF REFERENCES IN CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT TO
CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE

The IATA Conditions of Contract on the passenger ticket and air
waybill incorporate by reference the carriers' individual Conditions of
Carriage or Rules Tariff, as the case may be. The validity of this
reference and its effects have already been reflected upon in Court
decisions; because of express statutes in the United States (referred
to hereafter as U.S.) ,i legal questions relating to the problem in
that country are quite distinct from those in the United Kingdom
(referred to hereafter as U.K.). This is a matter of considerable interest to the carrier, for the Conditions of Carriage incorporate many
"special" terms which, in the absence of express agreement between
the parties to the contract of carriage, might not be upheld as valid
by the Courts.
Contract of Carriage is an Accepted Offer
In the U.K. the entire situation is subject to the operation of
Common Law. In accordance with the basic principles of obligations,
every agreement is an accepted offer, "the union into a single, whole
and undivided declaration of will of declarations, each in the same
sense, by several persons of their wills in respect of a particular
matter."" The contract of carriage must comply with this principle,
but the difficulty in the so-called "ticket cases" is that carriers set their
conditions and undertaking well in advance and passengers accept
these conditions in the majority of cases without giving too much
consideration to them.
Technically, an offer to carry by the carrier must be communicated
to the other party before it can be accepted by the passenger or shipper
to become an agreement. The communication has two important
aspects:
i - the manner in which communication is made; and
ii - the substance which is to be communicated.
It is easy to realize. that passengers or shippers might desire to set
aside a contract on the grounds that they did not properly understand
its terms (conditions and undertakings) , or that the agreement contained such provisions which would never have been agreed by them
had they had an opportunity to study the terms of the contract.
In cases in which a contract was evidenced by a ticket on an airline,
a railway or a boat, the person delivering the ticket (the airline, railway, ship owner or agent) is regarded as the offeror and the other
person (the intending passenger or depositor) as the offeree.
"A great number of contracts are in the present state of society
made by the delivery by one of the contracting parties to the other
of a document in common form stating the terms by which the per10 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, and CAB Economic Regulations.
11 Chapter 5, Para. 36, "Salmond and Williams on Contracts" (1945).
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son delivering it will enter into the proposed contract.
Such a form
'
constitutes the offer of the party who tenders it." 12
Such offers contain numerous terms governing the undertakings
of the offeror and the conditions in which the carriage is conducted.
Sometimes they modify or exclude statutory or common law liabilities
which would otherwise, in the absence of a contract, govern the
carriage. 13 Once the carrier seeks to take advantage of such a term,
the passenger or shipper may contend that the condition on which
the carrier desires to rely did not include the terms of the contract,
notwithstanding that the contract as such was or was not communicated
to the passenger or shipper.
The possible cases fall into four categories. If the contract is set
down in writing as is the case in air transportation, the law seems to
be clearly stated by the learned Justice Blackburn 14 as follows:
"And it is clear law that where there is a writing, into which the
terms of any agreement are reduced, the terms are to be regulated
by that writing. And though one of the parties may not have read
the writing, yet, in general, he is bound to the other by those terms;
and that, I apprehend, is on the ground that, by assenting to the
contract thus reduced to writing, he represents to the other side
that he has made himself acquainted with the contents of that writing and assents to them, and so induces the other side to act upon
that representation by entering into the contract with him, and is
consequently precluded from denying that he did make himself
acquainted with those terms."
If it can be proved that the passenger in fact, had the knowledge
of the term of the contract and its contents, then it is accepted that
the carrier shall have sufficiently communicated the term in question
to the passenger.' 5 If the passenger did not know of the contents of
the term, but knew that there were terms to the offer, the carrier
will again be able to rely on the Conditions of Carriage, as the passenger
will be estopped from denying that the terms of the contract were
communicated to him. The Courts 6 would construe the conduct of
the passengers in assenting to the offer which he knew was subject to
terms as representing to the carrier an agreement to the terms regardless of whether he read them or not. In fact, it might be said that
the attitude of the passenger induced the carrier to enter into a contract with him.
12 Watkins v. RymilI (1883)
10 Q.B.D. 178, 188; Thompson v. L. M. & S.
Ry., (1930) 1 k.b. 41, 47; Harris v. Great Western Ry. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 515,
532-3.
13 Hood v. Anchor Line, Henderson Bros. (1918) A.C. 837-846.
14Harris
v. Great Western Railway(s), (1876), 1 Q.B.D. 515, 530.
5
1in Parker v. South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416, 425; "Now as
regards each of the plaintiffs, if at the time he accepted the ticket, he, either by
actual examination of it, or by reason of previous experience, or from any other
cause, was aware of the terms or purport or effect of the endorsed conditions, it
can hardly
be doubted that he becomes bound by them."
' 6 Parker v. South Eastern Ry. (1877), 2 C.P.D. 416, 425; "Now if in the
course of making a contract one party delivers to another a paper containing
writing, and the party receiving the paper knows that the paper does, by receiving
and keeping it, assent to the conditions contained in it, although he does not read
them, and does not know what they are."
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Finally, there is the case where the passenger did not know that
there were terms attached to the offer, undoubtedly he will contend
that the terms were not communicated to him. If the carrier has done,
however, what is reasonably sufficient to give the passenger notice of
those terms, the passenger might be estopped from denying the knowledge of the terms.
It would seem that in all cases where a term is to be considered as
having been communicated to the passenger by reason of his having
accepted a ticket containing the term or a reference to it - and not
because he is in fact shown to have read the term - that term must be
of a usual and reasonable sort. The conduct of the passenger in accepting a ticket referring to conditions and undertakings of a contract, of
whose contents he is not aware, does not seem to mean that passenger
was content with unusual terms of the contract. It is sometimes said
that in such cases there is an implied understanding that the offer
does not contain any unusual terms except those to which the carrier
has called his passengers' attention in a special and distinctive way.
"The truth is, people are content to take these things on trust.
They know that there is a form which is always used - they are
satisfied it is not unreasonable, because people do not usually put
unreasonable terms into their contracts. . . . I think there is an
implied understanding that there is no condition unreasonable to
the knowledge of the party tendering the document and not insisting
on its being read - no condition not relevant to the matter in
hand."17
This passage raises a question as to what would be considered reasonable, which is a question for the Jury.
"Whether all that was reasonably necessary to give him (the
offeree) this notice was done is . . . a question of fact, in answering which the tribunal must look at all the circumstances and the
situation of the parties." 13
Where, however, the only reasonable conclusion on the evidence
would be that what was reasonably sufficient to effect communication
.was, or was not, done, the issue will not go to the Jury but will be
decided by the Court in favor of carrier or passenger accordingly.
There is a great deal of English law admitting the validity of a
contract where the carrier had done all that was reasonably sufficient
to call the attention of the passenger to the terms of the contract, more
particularly that the conditions and undertakings formed the basis of
the contract.' It appears that it is a question of fact in each case
whether it can be presumed that the passenger has assented to the
conditions by accepting the document. There are earlier cases which
17 Bramwell, L. J., in Parker v. South Eastern Ry., 2 C.P.D. 416, 428; Thompson v.'L. M. & S. Ry. (1930) 1 K.B. 41, 49-50, 53, 56; Cf. Gibaud v. G. E. Ry.
(1920) 3 K.B. 689 (affirmed (1921) 2 K.B. 426).
1SHenderson v. Stevenson (1875) L.R. 2 Sc. & Div. 470; 8 Digest 127, 855.
Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416; 8 Digest 129, 866. Richardson Spence & Co. and Lord Gough Steamship Co. v. Rowntree (1894) A.C.
217; 8 Digest 103, 689. Cooke v. Wilson (T.) Sons & Co. Ltd., (1915), 85 L.J.
(K.B.) 888, 8 Digest 104, 693.
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indicate that the passenger was bound by the conditions as a matter
of law.' 9 It will be interesting to note that where a carrier handed
over the document in an envelope sometime after the contract was
made, but immediately prior to the beginning of the flight, he was
estopped from relying on the rules of the Conditions included in
20
that document.
The question of validity of conditions referred to or contained in
the passenger ticket or consignment note was not disputed in cases
brought against Imperial Airways, 21 but in a recent Canadian case 22
it was held that where the conditions of the contract were signed by
the passenger, he is bound by the terms of that contract whether or
not he knew them or had noticed them.
These authorities seem to indicate that the reference on the passenger ticket and air waybill to carriers' General Conditions of Carriage, effectively incorporates, at least under English Law, the terms
of these Conditions in the Contract of Carriage.
Tariff Rules Are Part of the Contract of Carriage

The situation in the U.S. is somewhat different. Under the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, carriers are required to file
tariffs with the CAB. Once filed, and unless they are unlawful or
otherwise invalid, these tariffs determine the rights and obligations of
carriers. They become a part of the contract between the carrier and
the passenger.2 3 "Tariff" is defined in Economic Regulations of CAB
(221.1) as:
"... a publication containing rates applicable to the transportation
of persons or property, and rules relating to or affecting such
rates or transportation, whether such rates and rules are combined
in one publication or are stated in separate publications. A "looseleaf tariff" shall be deemed to consist of that combination of pages,
whether original or revised; which is currently effective."
While 403 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act requires only the filing of
tariffs showing all rates, fares and charges for air transportation, the
Economic Regulations (221.7) p. 5000 provide that:
"Rules relating to or affecting the application of rates may be
published in a tariff other than the tariff naming the rates."
19 Zunz v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1869) L.R. 4 QB. 539; 8 Digest 55, 367.
Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwark Ltd. and British American Air Services Ltd.
(1937) 1 All. E.R. 108.
21 Aslan v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. (1933), 149 L.T. 276; Digest Supp. Grein
v. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1937) 1 K.B. 50; (1936) 2 All. E.R. 1258 (1936) U.S.
Av. R. 211; Digest Supp. Westminster Bank, Ltd. v. Imperial Airways, Ltd.
(1936) U.S. Av. R. 39; Digest Supp. Philippson v. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1939)
A.C. 332; (1939) 1 All E.R. 761; (1939) U.S. Av. R. 63; Digest Supp.
22Ludditt v. Ginger Coote Airways, Ltd., (1942) 2 D.L.R. 29; (1942) 1
W.W.R. 465; 57 B.C.R. 176; 53 C.R.T.C. 353; (1942), U.S. Av. R. 159; affirmed
(1942) 4 D.L.R. 353; (1942) S.C.R. 406; 55 C.R.T.C. 1; Abr. Con. 599; (1942)
U.S. Av. R. 178; (1947) A.C. 233; (1947) 1 All E.R.-328; (1947) L.J.R. 1067;
177 "L.T. 344; 63 T.L.R. 157; (1947) 2 D.L.R. 241; (1947) 2 W.W.R. 591; 60
C.R.T.C. 265; (1947), U.S. Av. R. 1 2nd Digest Sup .... 95, 332, 335, 336, 341,
342, 343,
350,v.352,
353, 421.
S23
Mack
Eastern
Air Lines, Civ. No. 7941 (D.C. Mass. June 2, 1949) (2
Avi. 15,002); Jones v. Northwest Airlines, 22 Wash. 2d 863, 157P. 2d. 728 (1945)
(1 Avi. 1272); Boston & Maine Railway v. Hooker (233 U.S. 97).
2 0
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Section 403 (a)' of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides in part that
"Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such form and
manner, and shall contain such information, as the Board shall by
regulation prescribe; and the Board is empowered to reject any
tariff so filed which is not consistent with this section and such
regulation."
Section 403 (b) of the Act requires that the provisions in the Rules
Tariff shall be observed by both the carrier and the passenger. This
language is substantially the same as Section 6 (7) of the Interstate
Commerce Act (Title 49 U.S.C), and it is well established that a
carrier's tariff on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission has
an effect equivalent to law until declared unlawful by that Commission,
and that the provisions of those tariffs established the legal relationships of the parties. 24 This is so, irrespective of the injured party's
actual knowledge of the tariff provisions. 21
Any person may file a complaint with the Board asking that any
rule, regulation or practice be declared unreasonable or unlawful.2 6
Furthermore, the Board may investigate such matters on its own initiative.27 If the Board finds, after notice and hearings, that any rules,
regulations, or practices are unreasonable or unlawful, it may determine and prescribe lawful rules, regulations or practices.2 8
The foregoing seems to require that any rule determining liability
of the carrier must be approved by the CAB and is subject to question
by any party. The question of the reasonableness and legality of these
rules is within the sole jurisdiction of the CAB and Courts are without
jurisdiction to grant relief to a party until a finding has been made
by the Board that the rules are unlawful, or until the party alleges
that he has exhausted all his remedies before the Board.2 9
It is also established that reference on a ticket to the rules of a
filed tariff is valid though it was contended that time limit requirements (written notice within 30 days after occurrence of the injury)
are invalid because not set out in the passenger ticket issued to plaintiff,
and because the words, "Sold subject to tariff regulations," printed on
the ticket did not give plaintiff legal notice of the specific time limiting
provisions contained in the tariff, even if the latter was on file in
defendant's office. 30
24Lichten v. Eastern Airlines Inc. (2 Avi. (1946) (15098). Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros., (256 U.S. 566) (1921). Bosong and Maine R.R.
v. Hooker (238 U.S. 97) (1914). American Ry. Express Co. v. American Trust
Co. (47 F. 2d 17) (7th Cir. 1931).
25 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros., (256 U.S. 566) (1921).
26 U.S. Civil Aeronautics Act, Section 1002(a).
27 U.S. Civil Aeronautics Act, Section 1002(b).
28 U.S. Civil Aeronautics Act, Section 1002 (d).
29 Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 2 Avi. (1946) 15098. Jones v. Northwest
Airlines, supra. Adler v. Chicago and Southern Air Lines 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D.
Mo. 1941) (1 Avi. 995). Cf American Airlines v. Standard.
80 Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines. Aviation Cases (2) 1949, P. 15024. Defendant denies negligence and specifically further pleads as an affirmative defense
that the ticket sold to plaintiff for the flight in question contained the provision,
"Sold subject to tariff regulations" and that the time of plaintiff's flight on
defendant's airplane, there was an effective tariff duly filed, posted and pub-
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The Supreme Court of the State of Washington s ' also held that
passenger was bound by tariff regulations and that under them, in the
given case, passenger had no right to accommodations on subsequent
flights to the exclusion of other passengers scheduled for those flights.
The Court specifically held that
"His (plaintiff's) ticket was sold subject to tariff regulations
with which he was charged with notice."
The Supreme Court of Illinois held a passenger bound to take
notice of tariff regulations respecting time limits for filing written
notice of claim and commencing suit - the words on the ticket being,
' 32
"Sold subject to tariff regulations.
There is definite statutory requirement 3 that each carrier shall
post and make available for public inspection at each of its stations.
or offices at which property is received for transportation or at which
tickets for passenger transportation are sold, all of the currently effective tariffs. Contractual obligations and arrangements are governed
by the Civil Aeronautics Act and not by Common Law or some other
34
statute.
The cases heretofore cited seem to indicate that tariffs operate as a
matter of law and what is filed with the CAB as tariffs (not objected
to by the Civil Aeronautics Board) becomes a part of the contract between the carrier and passenger and shipper. A recent case before
the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Shortley and
Shortley vs. North Western Airlines Corporation) brought up, however, some disturbing findings and cast some doubt as to the generally
accepted view. In this case action was brought against North Western
Airlines by a husband to recover damages for injuries as a result of
negligent landing of one of defendant's airplanes and by wife for
damages for the loss of consortium of her husband as a result of those
injuries. The defense moved for summary judgment and contended
"that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action because written notice
of the male plaintiff's accident was not presented to the general office
lished, which provided in effect that no action should be maintained for personal
injury to a passenger unless written notice of the claim is presented in writing
to the defendant within 30 days after the occurrence of the injury and unless the
action is actually commenced within one year after such occurrence, but that no
such notice was given and the present action was not commenced within the times
respectively provided in said tariff.
31 Jones v. Northwest Airlines, 22 Wm. (2d) 863.
32 Koontz v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, 73 N.E. (2d.) 919. "Because
of the fact that the tariff regulations filed with the Commission are of an intricate and complex nature, it is manifestly impossible to imprint on tickets all of
the rules and regulations of the tariffs. These rules and regulations are nevertheless binding upon the carrier and the passenger. The carrier may not lawfully
deviate from its filed tariffs. It cannot obligate itself to deviate from the rates
and conditions of the tariffs. To permit a carrier to do so would open the door

to discrimination."
33 Economic Regulations (222.2 g.).
34 Schwartzman v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. 6 F.R.D. 517 (D. Neb.)

See also Rufus G. King, Jr., "The Effects of Tariff Provisions: Some Further
Observations," 16 J. AIR L. & C. 174 (1949) and Markham and Blair, "The Effects
of Tariff Provisions Filed Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938," 15 J. AIR
L. & C. 251 (1948).
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of the defendant within 90 days of the alleged occurrence and suit was
not instituted by plaintiffs within one year following the occurrence
as were required by the defendant's tariffs," but the motion was dismissed on the strength of the opinion that the inclusion of the particular provision in the tariff does not operate as a matter of law precluding
the plaintiff from maintaining an action within the period fixed by
law as a statute of limitation. Furthermore, it was indicated that the
provision on the passenger ticket: "The time limits for giving notice
of claims and the institution of suit are set forth in Carrier's tariffs"
was not sufficiently expressed and consequently could not be considered as an agreement between the plaintiff and the carrier giving effect
to the limitation as to claims for injuries and commencement of action
thereon.
While it was admitted that a contract imposing conditions as to
reasonable time for making claims and for the institution of actions
thereon (Gooch vs. Oregon Shortline Railroad Company 258 U. S. 22)
may be made, it was implied that this would at least require express
terms to be set forth on the ticket itself and preferably that such terms
should be signed by the passenger and shipper. Reference was made
to a cardinal rule laid down in the Majestic 166 U. S. 375, 386, 41 L.Ed.
1039, but this case does not seem to convey a requirement as severe as
the conclusion drawn therefrom. The passage in The Majestic requires only that "When a company desires to impose special and most
stringent terms upon its customers, in exoneration of its own liability
there is nothing unreasonable in requiring that those terms shall be
distinctly declared and deliberately accepted." It would follow that
in the Shortley case the term regarding time limitation in carrier's
tariffs was not distinctly declared and deliberately accepted. Surely
such conclusion is without definite foundation since nothing in the
Shortley case seems to convey doubt as to why the terms of the contract
published and filed with the CAB should not be construed as "distinctly declared" and why could not the acceptance of a ticket which
makes specific reference to published tariffs mean "deliberate acceptance" of the terms of tariffs on the part of the passengers. Furthermore, the cases referred to heretofore and also cited in the Memorandum acknowledged the validity of a reference to tariffs and accepted
the view that knowledge of the terms of the tariffs has been conveyed
to the passenger and shipper through such reference. Though some
of these cases were discussed in the Memorandum their strength has
not been convincingly destroyed.
Notwithstanding the ruling in the Shortley case the effects of which
cannot as yet be clearly determined, the U. S. situation appears to be
much like that in the U.K. in practice, the main distinction being that
the latter achieves fair protection of the public by means of Statute
whereas the former by the operation of Common Law. Also, in the latter, the rule is subjected to prior approval by the government agency
(CAB) and the former will not be tested except by the Courts. In both
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cases however, the reference-to the Conditions of Contract or Tariffs, to
serve as notice to the individual, is definitely necessary.
A cursory review indicates that French Courts are also extremely
severe in the matter of communication of offer and its acceptance, particularly if the contract contains clauses purporting to exclude or limit
carriers' responsibility. They admit their validity only if these clauses
have been duly called to the attention of the passenger or the shipper
at the time when the contract was concluded and if the language of
the clauses is clear and accurate.
The judgment in the case of Birdeau v. Cie d'Assur, La Protectrice
pronounced by the Cour de Cassation of France, 31 January 1950.
established clearly the French position. It referred to Article 105 of
a Decree of 12 January 1939 which provides that common road carriers
must bring to the knowledge of shippers the clauses which limit their
liability. In accordance with this case carriers can only make use of
the limitation of liability clause, as a defense, if they can prove that
the clause did appear on the waybill given to the shipper; if there
was no waybill given, or if the clause did not appear therein, carriers
cannot claim that the shipper had knowledge thereof through the
notice posted in the carrier's office unless they can prove that the shipper entered their offices. Though this case specifically refers to road
carriers it is suggested that it would equally apply to air carriers.
Generally, French jurisprudence would not give effect to a clause
limiting carrier's liability if it was not printed on the traffic document
(ticket or air waybill) though it was posted in carrier's office; or if
it was printed on the traffic document but the document was not made
out before the carriage started or if the document was not handed
over to the passenger or shipper. Also, if the print is in very small
characters, in the margin of the document, half hidden under a fiscal
stamp, or even appearing on the back of the document without being
referred to on the front.
It is understood that reference to the general conditions of a carier's organization would in itself not make a clause valid unless the
ticket or air waybill contained definite indication as to the limits of
the liability incorporated in the text of such general conditions.
The traffic documents used presently by IATA carriers would seem
to satisfy the requirements of British, U. S. and French courts as regards notice to passengers and shippers. These documents not only
call expressly the passenger's or the shipper's attention to the existence
of the General Conditions of Carriage, or Tariff, but also incorporate
the most important terms affecting carrier's liability.
CARRIER'S LIABILITY UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT

The second main function of the Conditions of Contract is to
incorporate terms relating to carriers' liability. The old IATA General Conditions of Carriage of 1931 were based on two fundamental
liability rules:
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i -- Carrier's fault was presumed where damage was sustained
during the period of air carriage in the event of death or
wounding of a passenger, destruction or loss or damage to
registered baggage, or destruction or loss or damage to goods.
ii-

The liability however was limited to the amounts prescribed
by the Warsaw Convention.

Generally speaking, carriers extended the liability rules of the Warsaw
Convention contractually to all carriage to which the Convention
would not otherwise apply.
In 1936, as regards passengers, "Special" conditions were adopted.
These special Conditions, which are added to.General Conditions of
Carriage published by British companies, provided in substance that
for carriage which was not governed by the Warsaw Convention "passengers and baggage are accepted for carriage only upon condition
that the carriers, their servants or agents, shall be under no lilability
in respect or arising out of the carriage." This declaration was followed
by a renunciation by passengers for themselves and their representatives and dependents for all claims for compensation for damage sustained on board the aircraft or in the course of any operations in
flight, embarking or disembarking caused directly or indirectly to
passengers or their belongings. The general effects of the clause were
that if the carriage was governed by English law, and the Warsaw
5
Convention was not applicable, carriers denied all liability
The "Leiden Conditions" drafted in 1939 which merely purported
to unify the "Conditions" to be printed on the IATA traffic documents, were in conformity with the 1931 IATA General Conditions
of Carriage and they also included the "Disclaimer Clause."
When traffic documents and conditions of carriage were drafted
for transatlantic air services in 1939 in New York, it was pointed out
that in order to achieve similar effects of Carriers' Conditions of Carriage under American law as obtained in the U.K. and in Europe
generally, considerable changes might be required in the liability
rules of the old IATA Conditions of Carriage. The new conditions
which were to be incorporated in the proposed traffic documents were
a combination of what was considered to be the minimum essential
conditions required to deal with legal situations existing both in
35 Special Conditions: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 1, Article 18, paragraph 1, subparagraph (1) and paragraph 2, Passengers
and Baggage, it is expressly declared that, so far as concerns carriage which is
not 'International Carriage,' as defined in Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the
General Conditions (c), and in Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention
of Warsaw of 12th October, 1929, passengers and baggage are accepted for carriage only upon conditions that the carriers, their servants or agents shall be
under no liability in respect or arising out of the carriage; and that passengers
renounce for themselves, their representatives and dependents all claims for compensation for damage sustained on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of flight embarking or disembarking, caused directly or indirectly
to passengers or their belongings or to persons who, except for this condition,
might have been entitled to make a claim, and whether caused or occasioned by
the act, neglect or default of the carriers, their servants or agents, or otherwise
howsoever."

UNIFORM DOCUMENTS AND CONDITIONS

America and in the Eastern Hemisphere."s Two sets of Conditions
were prepared:
i - The suggested "Passenger (contract) Ticket Liability Rules"
of 1939 were simple. Where these rules were not in conflict with
the law to be applied by the Court seized of the case, carriers,
their servants and agents were under no liability in respect or
arising out of the carriage or any service or operations of the carriers, their servants or agents. In addition to this disclaimer,
all claims were renounced by passengers as in the clause adopted
in 1936 by the British carriers. Finally, for registered baggage,
the liability of carriers was limited to one hundred dollars.
ii - The liability rules in the draft "Terms and Conditions" on
the back of the air waybill were quite different; carriers denied
all liability for loss, damage, deterioration, destruction, theft, pilfering, delay or default or non-delivery or misdelivery which was
not caused by the airline's actual negligence or that of its servants,
agents or employees acting within the scope of their authority, or
which were due to war risks or to the act or restraint of any government, or to strikes, riots or civil commotion. An attempt was
also made to limit carriers' liability notwithstanding negligence on
their part to the "amount of consignor's declared value for carriage." Finally, carriers expressly denied liability for loss of profit
or for consequential or special damages.
In other words, for transatlantic carriage, carriers excluded all liability regarding passengers, but undertook limited liability as regards
registered baggage and goods in every instance where fault was proven.
While, due to the outbreak of World War II, these liability rules
never achieved great practical importance, they seem to reflect certain
influence of American law on the IATA liability rules.
The first new IATA Conditions of Contract drafted at Rio de
Janeiro in 1947 adopted in general the liability regime suggested in
1939 for transatlantic traffic. Carriers agreed to deny all passenger
liability whether or not caused by the act, neglect or default of the
carriers or otherwise. The new IATA Conditions of Contract therefor
eliminated the need for the Special Clause.
In the 1948 Bermuda amendments to the IATA Conditions of
Contract, carriers reversed this position and, in general, denied liability on their part except if the damage was proved to have been
caused by their negligence or wilful fault, and without contributory
negligence on the part of the passenger. These Conditions attempt to
limit this liability of carrier, so far as legally possible, to the amounts
adopted in the Warsaw Convention as far as passengers are concerned,
and to one hundred dollars (U.S. funds) as regards registered and
87
personal property.
36 Draft

Report of the Committee appointed to prepare forms of Traffic Docu-

ments and Conditions of Carriage for Transatlantic air services for submission
to the 39th General Meeting of the International Traffic Association. (IATA
Library.)
87 "Except as the convention or other applicable law may otherwise require(a) Carrier is not liable for any death, injury, loss or claim of whatsoever nature
(hereinafter collectively referred to as 'damage') arising out of or in connection
with carriage or other services hereunder, unless such damage is proved to have
been caused by the negligence or wilful fault of Carrier and there has been no
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In case of goods, the charges for carriage having been based upon
the value declared by shipper, it is agreed that any liability shall in
no event exceed the shipper's declared value for carriage stated on
the face thereof, and in the absence of such declaration by shipper,
liability of Carrier shall not exceed 250 such French gold francs or
their equivalent per kilogram of goods destroyed, lost, damaged or
delayed; all claims shall be subject to proof of value. In both cases,
on the ticket and air waybill, it is expressly provided that the carrier
issuing an air waybill for carriage exclusively over the lines of others
does so only as a sales agent.
Burden of Proof
In addition to the apparent variety in the degree of liability reflected in carriers' conditions of contracts in the past twenty years,
perhaps the development as to the burden of proof in the conditions
deserves some attention.
Generally, in common law, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
who must prove fault on the part of carrier in order to justify his
claim. This general rule was not incorporated in the Warsaw Convention. Indeed, the Convention established a presumption of fault
on the carriers' part and shifted the burden of proof as a quid pro quo
for the limited liability granted to air carriers. The Warsaw rule as
to proof applies only to carriage governed by the Convention, whereas
other carriage, in the absence of contractual arrangement would fall
under the general rule.
The old IATA conditions of carriage extended the Warsaw rules
contractually to carriage not governed by the Convention. As a result,
passengers and shippers were never obliged to prove fault (except
dol or wilful misconduct) on part of carriers who in all cases were
liable up to the Warsaw limits, unless they could prove that they had
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was im-

possible for them to take such measures.
contributory negligence of the passenger; (b) Carrier is not liable for any damage directly or indirectly arising out of compliance with laws, government regulations, orders or requirements or from any cause beyond Carrier's control; (c)
in any event liability of Carrier for death, injury or delay of a passenger shall
not exceed 125,000 French gold francs (consisting of 65Y2 milligrams of gold
with a fineness of 900 thousandths) or its equivalent; (d) liability of Carrier in
respect of baggage and other personal property is limited to its declared value
which shall not exceed $100 (U.S. currency) or its equivalent per passenger, unless a higher valuation is declared in advance and additional charges are paid
pursuant to Carrier's tariffs; (e) a carrier issuing a ticket or checking baggage
for carriage over the lines of others does so only as agent, and no carrier shall
be liable for any damage not occurring on its own lines unless proved to have
been caused by its own negligence or wilful fault; (f) in the case of a carrier
having its principal place of business in the British Empire or in Ireland, or in
any case where this contract is governed by British or Irish law, the carrier
reserves the right to refuse to carry any passenger, and passengers are carried
upon condition that the carrier shall be under no liability in respect of carriage
or of any other services or operations performed by it, and the passenger by
acceptance of this ticket renounces for himself, his representatives and dependents
all claims for compensation for damage arising out of or during the performance
of the contract, caused to or sustained by any person who, except for this condition, might have been entitled to make a claim, and whether caused by act, neglect
or default of the carrier, or otherwise."
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Unlike this system, the transoceanic conditions drafted in New
York in 1939 and the postwar IATA conditions of contract adopted
in Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and amended in Bermuda in 1949, do not
purport to extend contractually all of the Warsaw rules to carriage
not governed by the Convention. Consequently passengers and shippers
are bound to prove fault on part of carriers. In other words, the
common law rule was not altered in these new conditions and the
burden of proof remained with the plaintiff.
There is nothing inconsistent in the objectives of the new IATA
conditions with the efforts of carriers to obtain universality in the
rules governing international carriage. The apparent lack of a single
rule for all air carriage (on the basis of the Warsaw Convention) is
not ideal but not without serious justification. In certain jurisdictions,
the making of Warsaw rules contractually binding on passengers and
shippers would have a peculiar result. In the U.S. only sixteen states s8
have statutes establishing maximum amounts recoverable in suits for
wrongful death which have the effect of limiting the liability of carriers for deaths of passengers in those states. In the remaining states,
there is no arbitrary limitation upon amounts recoverable for wrongful death, but in accordance with the common law principle, "any
contract purporting to exempt a common carrier of persons from
liability for negligence of itself, or its servants, to a passenger for
compensation is void as being against public policy." 9 The contracts
of air carriers which purported to exempt carriers from or limit their
liability by private contract were held to be invalid. 40 Furthermore,
no statutory limitation exists for amounts recoverable by passengers
for personal injuries.
Under the circumstances, the Courts interpreting the contract of
carriage, if not under the Warsaw Convention, would appear to recognize the presumption of'fault on the part of the carrier, but in the
absence of an international treaty would ignore the liability limitations for negligence by contract. In other words, the contract would
be interpreted to the great disadvantage of the carriers. While they
could not avail themselves of the liability limitations, their position
would be unduly worsened before the Courts. They would practically
undertake an unlimited absolute liability with only one defence if
they could prove to have done everything to avoid the accident.
It is significant that the change in the liability rules in the IATA
conditions coincided with the beginning of transatlantic commercial
38 Colorado, $10,000; Connecticut, $20,000; Illinois, $20,000; Indiana, $15,000;
Kansas, $15,000; Maine, $10,000; Massachusetts, $15,000-Minimum $2,000; Minnesota, $17,500; Missouri, $15,000; New Hampshire, $10,000; New Mexico, 10,000; Oregon, $10,000; South Dakota, $20,000; Virginia, $15,000; West Virginia,
$10,000; Wisconsin, $15,000 (Larger amount may be awarded, up to $2,500 to
parent, husband or wife; widow with dependent children may recover up to
$7,500 above maximum).
39 5 R.C.L. sec. 685, p. 8 (1929).
40 Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., 1931 U.S. Av. Rep. 205;
Allison v. Standard Airlines, 65 F. 2d 668, 1933 U.S. Av. Rep. 92; Curtiss-Wright
Flying Service Inc. v. Glose, 66 F. 2d 711, 1933 U.S. Av. Rep. 26; Conklin v.
Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692, 1935 U.S. Av. Rep. 97.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

operations and participation of U.S. carriers in IATA. Because of the
impossibility under U.S. law -to limit common carriers' liability by
contract, it appears to be impracticable, at least as far as carriers are
concerned who operate into the U.S., to extend the Warsaw rules to
"non-Warsaw" carriage in Carriers' Conditions of Carriage.
Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Opinion attached to the CAB Order approving the IATA
Conditions of Contract (Traffic Conferences Resolution) 41 specifically
raised the question of burden of proof. It questioned whether the
respective part of the IATA Contract 42 denying liability except in
case of proven fault of carrier, would not possibly be construed as
an effort to avoid the application of the legal doctrine res ipsa loquitur"
insofar as death, injury or damage to personal property in the custody
of the passenger isconcerned (which would place certain burdens of
proof on carriers).
44
Res ipsa loquitur has two main requirements:
i - that the occurrence was such that does not ordinarily happen
if due care has been taken;
ii - that the instrumentality was under the exclusive control of
the defendant when the accident occurred.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although it provides a substitute
for direct proof of negligence where plaintiff was unable to point out
the specific act of negligence which caused his injury, is a rule of
necessity to be invoked only when, under the circumstances, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. 45 As a principle, the
application of res ipsa loquitur will depend on the circumstances of
4
each individual accident. 0
41

September 1, 1949.

42 Conditions of Contract, para. 4 (IATA Traffic Conference Resolutions 275a
and 540a).
4. Thompson's Commentary in the Law of Negligence, Vol. 3, section 2754
states:
"In every action by a passenger against a carrier to recover damages predicated upon the negligence or misconduct of the latter, the burden of proof in the
first instance, is of course, upon the plaintiff to connect the defendant in some
way with the injury for which he claims damages. But when the plaintiff has
sustained and discharged this burden of proof by showing that the injury arose
in consequence of the failure, in some respect or other, of the carrier's means of
transportation, or the conduct of the carrier's servants, then, in conformity with
the maxim res ipsa loquitur, a presumption arises of negligence on the part of
the carrier or his servants, which, unless rebutted by him to the satisfaction of
the jury, will authorize a verdict and judgment against him for the resulting
damages. Stated somewhat differently, the general rule may be said to be that
where an injury happens to the passenger in consequence of the breaking or
failure of the vehicle, roadway, or other appliance owned or controlled by the
carrier, and used by him in making the transit, or in consequence of the act,
omission or mistake of his servants, the person entitled to sue for the injury
makes out a prima facie case for damages against the carrier by proving the
contract of carriage; that the accident happened in consequence of such breaking
or failure, or such act, omission, or mistake of his servants; and that in consequence of the accident the plaintiff sustained damage."
44 Brott et al v. Western Air Lines Inc. (2 Av. 14,701).
45 Witcher v. Board of Education Rensselar (233) App. Div. 184, 251).
46 Dykstra and Dykstra (1946) p. 272 The Business Law of Aviation. "In
spite of the vast advances which have been made in air transport, it is still
recognized that in all such operations there is a wide element of chance which
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Though in the regime of the Bermuda Conditions the burden of
proof is generally on the plaintiff, the effects of application of res ipsa
loquitur cannot be neglected. Some of the U.S. decisions hold that
the doctrine, if applied, results in a "presumption of fault." Others
consider it as a "permissible inference" and, again, others as a prima
facie case. Finally, there is a view, prevailing in the U.K. cases, that
if the doctrine is applied, "the burden of proof is shifted" to the
47
defendant carrier.
Perhaps the divergency in the U.S. judgments regarding the application of res ipsa loquitur is due to the continued use of the same
words res ipsa loquitur to describe all the rules mentioned heretofore,
without distinguishing between them. 4 . The system whereby res ipsa
loquitur does not shift the burden of proof on defendant entirely, is
considered to be just and fair to air transportation, and the draftsmen
of the Bermuda Contract did not intend to interfere with its application in the United States or otherwise.
Following their adoption, the provisions of the postwar Bermuda
Conditions of Carriage, dealing with carriers' liability were subject
to some criticism. Generally, two objections were made:.
i-that the postwar IATA Conditions (1949) did not make the
Warsaw liability rules applicable to carriage not "international" under the Convention, as did the prewar IATA Conditions (1931) ; and
ii- that the so-called "Disclaimer Clause"was unreasonable.
The first of these technical questions has already been dealt with
the ingenuity of man has not yet overcome; and we accordingly cannot apply the
doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' to the same extent as we do to accidents on highways."
47 Chief Justice Groner in Capital Transit Co. v. Jackson 80 U.S. App. D.C.,
162, 164, clearly explains that: "in the District of Columbia the rule is that, when
'res ipsa' is applicable, it permits an inference of negligence and thus establishes
a 'prima facie' case, or in other words, makes a case to be decided by a jury.
-But it does not shift the burden of the proof. When all the evidence is in, the
question for the jury still is whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff."
.
48 Smith et al. v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp. (U.S. 2 Av. p. 14,619):
"The concept of 'res ipsa loquitur' has been variously defined and explained. The
prevailing view is that this doctrine under certain circumstances treats the occurrence of an accident as itself constituting evidence of negligence. It permits,
although it does not compel, an inference of negligence from the event. Proof of
the accident alone becomes sufficient to make out the plaintiff's 'prima facie' case
and to shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence.
The inference authorized by the rule of 'res ipsa loquitur' must be weighed in
conjunction with the evidence offered by the defendant, and does not relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of proof resting on him on the entire case. The doctrine
finds its principal application in case of injuries caused by a mechanism entirely
controlled by the defendant, especially if the circumstances are such that the
accident would probably not have occurred but for a failure on the part of some
human being."
"In our opinion, 'res ipsa loquitur' means that the facts of the occurrence
warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference;
that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence
of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be
accepted as sufficient; that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily
that they require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that
they forestall the verdict. 'Res ipsa loquitur' where it applies, does not convert
the defendant's general issue into an affirmative defense. When all the evidence
is in, the question for the jury is, whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff."
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in the preceding paragraphs but the background and justification of
the second question require some explanation.
The British Disclaimer Clause
The origin of the clause goes back to 1936, when it was first adopted
by IATA as an optional clause. Since 1936 this condition has been
incorporated in all displayed Conditions of Carriage and in reference
to Conditions on the tickets or ticket covers of British companies,
sometimes under the following heading:
"Special Condition applicable to air journeys which are not
'International Carriage' as defined by the Convention of Warsaw
for the unification of certain Rules relating to International Transport of the 12th October, 1929."
This special condition was also adopted by foreign companies
operating into British territory because they anticipated the possibility
of claims which might develop into actions in the British Courts. The
Conditions of Contract in the first postwar IATA documents did not
include such a clause because the liability system adopted in those
first Conditions excluded carriers' liability generally. Under those
circumstances, there was no need for the special "disclaimer clause."
In 1949, when the Conditions of Contract were modified and the new
IATA Conditions of Carriage were adopted as a recommended practice, the "Special Clause" reappeared in the Conditions of Contract. 0
The necessity for the "Special Disclaimer Clause" arose from a
technical decision of the English Court 0 founded upon the precise
wording of the English Fatal Accidents Act, the effect of this decision
being that carriers' liability to the dependents of a deceased passenger
could be excluded altogether, but could not be limited. The features
of the "Disclaimer Clause" were twofold:
i - the right of the carrier to refuse to carry any passengers; and
ii - the renunciation by the passenger for himself and his representatives of all claims or compensation for damages by the
act, neglect, or default of the carrier.
In Mexico City in November 1949, the clause was further extended
to include:
iii - the express denial of common carrier status of the carrier and
an indemnification against any claim which might be brought
against the carrier.5'
494(f) and 4(e) of the Conditions of Contract printed on Passenger Ticket
and Baggage Check and Air Waybill respectively.
50 Nunan v. Southern Ry. Co. (1923) 2 K.B. 703.
51 Condition 4(f). "If Carrier's principal place of business is in territory of
the British Empire or British Commonwealth of Nations, or in Ireland, or if the
law applicable to the contract of carriage is the law of any such territory or any
part thereof, it is a condition of the contract of carriage that Carrier is not a
common carrier and reserves the right to refuse to carry any passenger, and that
passengers and baggage are accepted for carriage only upon condition that Carrier shall be under no Liability in respect or arising out of the carriage, and that
passengers renounce for themselves, their representatives and dependents all
claims for compensation for injury (fatal or otherwise), loss, damage or delay,
howsoever caused, sustained on board the aircraft, or in the course of any of the
operations of flight, embarking or disembarking, caused directly or indirectly to
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While the first and third features of the clause were designed to
avoid the heavy obligations of a common carrier under English law
and implied warranty in the contract of carriage that the aircraft were
52
fit for the purpose for which they were intended under the contract,
the second feature contained the renunciation and the disclaimer of
all liability, the necessity of which was indicated above.
It is well known that U.K. and U.S. Law differ as to common carriers. Not only the degree of care to be exercised by common carrier
is different, but also the considerations prevailing as to the circum53
stances under which a carrier was to become a common carrier.
In England, "a common carrier is so called as being a person who
54
proves himself ready to carry goods for everybody":
"If a man who owned an aeroplane or a seaplane chose to engage
in the trade of carrying goods as a regular business and to hold
himself out as ready to carry for any who wish to employ him so
far as he had room.in his airship or aeroplane for their goods, very
likely he will become a common carrier or be under the various
liabilities of a common carrier." 55
There has been no English case in which Article 4 (f) of the IATA
Conditions of Contract (or any similar disclaimer) has been successfully challenged in the British Courts. There have, of course, been
many claims, but very few of them reached the Courts, possibly because
plaintiff's counsel has advised that the disclaimer clause is an effective
bar.
In the U.S., a disclaimer of common carrier status by an air carrier
would not effectively alter the status if the circumstances would point
to operations of a common carrier. 56 In Canada, the disclaimer clause
was tested in the Ludditt v. Ginger Coote Airways Case57 and upheld
by the Privy Council. In Scotland it came up in the case of McKie v.
Scottish Airways, and went up to the Court of Appeal in Scotland. In
this case it was argued by the plaintiff that the disclaimer clause was
contrary to public policy since it was wide enough to exclude claims
for wilful misconduct. The court sidestepped this issue as no wilful
misconduct was proved and therefore it was not necessary to take a
stand one way or the other.
passengers or their belongings or to persons who, but for this condition, might
have been entitled to claim, and whether caused or occasioned by the act, neglect
or default of Carrier, or otherwise howsoever, and that passengers for themselves
and their estates will indemnify Carrier against any such claim."
52 As to the rights and liabilities of common arld private carriers, see Coggs
v. Bernard (1703) 2 L.D.R.A.Y.M. 909.
53 Hope v. United Airlines (U.S. Av. R. 179).
54 Great Northern Railway Co. v. L.E.P. Transport and Depository Ltd.
(1922) 2 K.B. 742 at Page 765.
55 MacKinnon in Aslan v. Imperial Airways Limited (1933) 38 Com. Cas. 227
at page 235.
56 North American Accident Insurance Co. v. Pitts-1925 (1928 U.S. Av. R.
178). Smith v. O'Donnell-1932 (U.S. Av. R. 145). Conklin v. Canadian Colonial
Airways-1934 (U.S. Av. R. 21).
57 Ludditt v. Ginger Coote Airways (1947) U.S. Av. R. 1, Second Digest Suppl.
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This decision implied the term "public policy" which is very difficult to define. 58 In the leading English case, it was stated:
". public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you
from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when all other
points fail."5 9
Lord Halsbury said:
"I deny that any court can invent a new head of public policy
...it is because these things have been either enacted or assumed
to be by, the Common Law unlawful, and not because a judge or
such things are in his or
court have a right to declare that certain
60
their view, contrary to public policy."
On the other hand, some of the more recent decisions hardly seem
to be consistent with Lord Halsbury's view. For example, McCardie, J.
said:

61

"The truth of the matter seems to be that public policy is a
variable thing. It must fluctuate with the circumstances of the
times."
It would be arbitrary to say in what circumstances the Courts
would uphold the clause. In case of wilful misconduct or gross negligence of the carrier, it is probable that English Courts would hold
the "Disclaimer Clause" contrary to public policy. This is, however,
merely speculation, since no case involving the point in question has
yet been tried before U.K. Courts as regards air carriage or surface
carriage.
The objections which were raised against the "Disclaimer Clause"
of the IATA Conditions of Carriage prompted carriers to seek means
by which the "Disclaimer Clause" could be eliminated. The necessity
to deny the common carrier status was first attacked. The effect of this
denial was:
i-that the carrier cannot be compelled to accept for -carriage
either goods or passengers unless he chooses to do so;
ii-that his liability in the event of loss of, or damage to, goods
does not exceed that of a bailee at common law, i.e., that he
does not incur an "absolute" or "insurer's" liability;
iii -that any condition in the contract by which the carrier purports to negative or to restrict his liability in certain events,
e.g. in the event of fire or of theft, will be construed as covering the case in which such event was caused by the negligence
of the carrier himself or his servants.
Since a "common carrier of passengers" is not liable like an insurer
and he is merely liable to take "all due care," it was found that the
only effect of his being a "common" carrier consists in his duty not
to discriminate between would-be passengers. Whether a carrier is
58 For general notes on the subject, see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 7,
pp. 173, et seq.
59 Richardson v. Millish (1824).
60 Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd. (1902).
61 Naylor, Benzon & Co. Ltd. v. Krainesche Industre Gesselschaft (1918)
1 K.B.
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a common carrier of passengers or not, therefore seems to be irrelevant
as far as the liability of carrier is concerned. 6 2 Consequently, the
express denial of common carrier status was not essential.
The situation regarding baggage is different. If an air carrier is
considered to be a common carrier of passengers, it must be assumed
that he is also a common carrier of their baggage6 3 and as such, cannot
refuse to carry baggage. The express denial of common carrier status
in this case had the effect of avoiding carrier's absolute liability and
of authorizing him to pick and choose freely between baggage to be
carried. The same objective is served by 4 (a) of the Conditions of
Contract which negatived absolute liability, and Article 9 of the
Bermuda Conditions which authorizes carrier to refuse to carry any
baggage if in his opinion its weight, size or character rendered it
unsuitable for carriage. The express denial therefore was again not
considered necessary to achieve these goals.
In case of goods, the significance of the "Disclaimer Clause" in the
Conditions of Contract on the air waybill is that it purports to exclude
the common carriers' absolute liability for loss and damage and to
put air carriers in the same category as private carriers, whose liability
in respect of goods depends on negligence. 64 But this objective is effectively achieved in the general liability rules included in the Conditions
of Contract printed on the air waybill. Furthermore, the effects of
the Aslan case 65 which implied that a common carrier has an absolute
warranty for the cargo worthiness of the aircraft is unambiguously
excluded in Article 11 (3) (e) of the Bermuda Conditions.6 6
Based upon these considerations, carriers (in Madrid, 1950) decided
to delete from the "Disclaimer Clause" the denial of their common
carrier status. The clause remained, however, as a disclaimer of all
67
liability of carriers in order to nullify the effects of the Nunan case.
On January 30, 1952, a long awaited action took place. The U.K.
Government made and laid before Parliament the Carriage by Air
(Non-international Carriage) U.K. Order. This Order became effective April 1, 1952. In substance, it applied the rules of the Warsaw
Convention, with only some exceptions, to all carriage. By and large,
air carriers' liability for all carriage which is subject to this Order,
will be limited to the amounts specified in the Warsaw Convention.
While this was not the first time a State decided to extend the Warsaw
rules to air carriage generally (Scandinavian countries, Switzerland,
etc., have done so long before), the U.K. Order in Council has particular importance inasmuch as it will greatly reduce the need for
the British "Special Clause."
Since in other jurisdictions where, on the basis of Fatal Accident
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Readhead v. Midland Railway Co. (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 379.

Caswell v. Chesshire Lines Committee (1907) 2 K.B. 499.
Turner v. Civil Service Supply Association Ltd. (1926) 1 K.B. 50.
Aslan v. Imperial Airways Ltd. (1933) 149 L.T. 276.
66 "No warranty concerning any aircraft engaged in the carriage or concerning its fitness for the carriage of the goods to which the contract relates is implied
in the contract of carriage."
67 Nunan v. Southern Railway Co. (1923) 2 K.B. 703.
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Acts, the Nunan case would be followed, carriers could still not
effectively limit contractually their liability vis-a-vis the relatives of
the deceased, the necessity for the "Disclaimer Clause" will not entirely
disappear with the issuance of the British Order in Council. Whether
or not carriers will take the risk of the deleting it prior to action
by the respective governments (through Orders in Council or otherwise) has not yet been determined.
The foregoing indicates that the efforts of the airlines to obtain
maximum uniformity have so far resulted only in an agreed set of
rules dealing with the liability of the carrier, included in the IATA
Conditions of Contract printed on the ticket and air waybill. These
rules, nothwithstanding some of the objections 'raised against them,
appear to have been crystallized in the form adopted at Bermuda
in 1949. They are sound and fair to both the traveling public, the
shippers and the carriers. Moreover, they form the basis of a contract
which creates valid obligations in perhaps all legal systems.
In order to properly evaluate these rules, many factors must be
taken into consideration. The most important of these is the fact
that the IATA documents constitute an effort to incorporate in uniform documents the legal principles of numerous countries, even
though the liability laws of these countries applicable to international
air transportation are far from being uniform. As a result, carriers
in some jurisdiction are given greater protection than in others. It is
hardly within IATA prerogatives to insist that a carrier forego the
legal protection given to it by the laws of its country, any more than
it is within its prerogative to require a carrier to accept in its documents the legal principles of another country. The Conditions of
Contract presently contained in the documents endeavor to satisfy
the various legal points of view and they appear to be consistent with
the legal principles of the jurisdictions accounting for the major share
of passenger and cargo traffic. They contain reasonable and fair rules
governing air carriage. The divergencies between the interpretations
of the contract in the various jurisdictions do not affect the soundness
of the contract which, nonetheless, puts passengers and shippers
throughout the world generally in much the same position.
There is, as yet, no complete uniformity in the detailed Conditions
of Carriage which carriers have found necessary since the war. Carriers
are continuing their efforts to achieve this goal through various means.
It is appreciated, however, that the rapid growth of air transport
activity may not again make possible a rigid set of rules like the prewar
IATA Conditions of Carriage. Future endeavors will probably require
more flexible provisions, adaptable to changing traffic conditions and
developments.

